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Abstract
Previous studies have shown that the perceived times of voluntary actions and their effects are perceived as shifted towards
each other, so that the interval between action and outcome seems shortened. This has been referred to as ‘intentional
binding’ (IB). However, the generality of this effect remains unclear. Here we demonstrate that Intentional Binding also
occurs in complex control situations. Using an aircraft supervision task with different autopilot settings, our results first
indicated a strong relation between measures of IB and different levels of system automation. Second, measures of IB were
related to explicit agency judgement in this applied setting. We discuss the implications for the underlying mechanisms,
and for sense of agency in automated environments.
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Introduction
Automation and feeling of control
We live in an increasingly technological world. Automated
systems certainly can make life easier, but can also create
complexity and uncertainty. For example, the important role of
automation aids in aviation can lead pilots to the following
important question: ‘‘who is in control now?’’ [1]. More
particularly, the interposition of more and more automation
between pilot and aircraft tends to distance pilots from many
details of the flying, decreasing their feeling of control [2].
Measuring the feeling of control may be important in evaluating
different automated devices, and may also be relevant to
evaluating pilot performance. It follows that better measurement
and psychological understanding of the human sense of control
could contribute to better automatic system design. On the
other hand, studying complex control situations, like human
interactions with automated devices, may improve our under-
standing of cognitive mechanisms that underlie the feeling of
control.
Quantifying human agency
When we act, we usually have a clear feeling that we control our
own action and can thus produce effects in the external
environment. This feeling has been described as ‘‘the sense of
agency’’ [3], and is recognised as an important part of normal and
human consciousness. However, the sense of agency has proved
difficult to quantify, and its basis and limits remain unclear.
Central to the sense of agency is temporal contiguity between one’s
action and the resultant effects [4–6]. Interestingly, the reverse
seems also true: human intentional actions produce systematic
changes in time perception. In particular, the interval between a
voluntary action and an outcome is perceived as shorter than the
interval between a physically similar involuntary movement and
the same outcome event. This phenomenon, called intentional
binding [7], may provide an implicit window into human agency.
Intentional binding has been widely reported [8–14].
Several questions remain about the factors that produce a sense
of agency. For example, agency comes by degrees: one can feel
more or less in control. This variation is particularly clear when
using machines. The feeling of control varies quite subtly as the
relation between operator inputs and machine response [2], [15],
[16]. However, previous tasks relied either on explicit binary
judgements of agency vs. non-agency in self-other discrimination
paradigms [17], or on contrasting binding between entirely
voluntary and entirely involuntary situations [7]. Finally, interac-
tions with complex machinery are clearly one area where sense of
agency is important, but may be difficult to achieve: surprisingly
no study, as far as we know, has investigated sense of agency in
such applied settings.
We therefore explored sense of agency in a complex setting
involving flying an aircraft with various degrees of autopilot
assistance. Using both implicit (intentional binding) and explicit
(verbal reports) measures of agency, we demonstrate that degree of
automation influences both measures. Our results validate
intentional binding as a measure of sense of agency, identify the
conditions for experiencing agency in automation settings, and
suggest new measures for quantifying human experience of control
over critical machinery.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants signed a written declaration of informed
consent. The procedure was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki, but no specific ethical approval was
obtained considering that ONERA has no Institutional Review
Board.
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Participants
Thirteen participants (4 females; mean age of 32 years) from the
french aerospace lab took part. Participants were naive to the
purposes of the manipulation, had normal or corrected- to-normal
vision and no particular expertise in controlling an aircraft.
Materials and apparatus
The simulator (see Fig. 1) included a navigation display (22-in
screen) including the navigation of the aircraft in the horizontal
plane and the surrounding traffic. An adjacent monitor (17-in
touch screen) showed an autopilot interface, and allowed the
participant to change the aircraft’s horizontal trajectory in case of
conflict, such as being too close to another aircraft. Moreover, a
scale below the autopilot interface enabled recording of partici-
pants’ responses to agency questions (see later). Thus, the autopilot
interface allowed the participant to choose and then execute
actions, in a manner analogous to the keypresses in a standard
agency experiment. The navigation display showed the effect of
the executed action as a visual representation of aircraft heading.
Design and procedure
The participants’ task was to track the progress of their aircraft
on a predefined flight path and intervene as the situation required.
In particular, when another aircraft appeared on the flight path,
the participant had to perform an appropriate command (see later)
to change their aircraft’s heading direction using the autopilot
interface.
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows (see Fig. 2).
At the beginning of each trial, participants supervised the
navigation of the aircraft on the flight plan. (1) After a randomized
short interval, a conflict appeared due to presence of an obstacle
(another aircraft) on their path. The participant detected the
conflict by a red circle around the obstacle. (2) The participant
decided an appropriate heading command, (3) implemented it
using a scroll wheel on the interface, and (4) finally executed it by
pressing an engagement button. Importantly, the action was
effective only after the participant’s engagement of the command.
This engagement was marked by the appearance of a green light
on the interface coupled to a short sound. (5) After a controlled
temporal delay, feedback concerning the success of the action
engaged was sent to the participants: a green message ‘‘resolved’’
plus a sound if successful action; a red message ‘‘not resolved’’ with
a different sound if not. (6) After each trial, and whatever the
success of the command engaged, participants had to estimate on a
scale from 0 s to 3 s the temporal delay perceived between the
keypress to engage their command and the appearance of the
visual feedback (‘‘conflict resolved’’ or ‘‘conflict not resolved’’). In
the Full Automated Control condition (see below), where
participants did not make a keypress, they judged the time
between the appearance of the green ‘engagement’ light plus
accompanying sound and the conflict resolution feedback. They
were told that the possible range of delays was between 1 ms and
2999 ms. In fact, only three Action/Effect delays (750 ms,
1500 ms, and 2250 ms) were presented, in a random order.
In order to meet the task requirement, participants had
automation tools to predict conflicts with the surrounding traffic,
alert humans of this conflict, and provide commands or guidance
to resolve the conflict. In order to study how level of automation
affect the sense of agency, automation level was varied between
block of trials. In accordance with an established classification
[18], four different levels of automation were tested (see Fig. 3)
with, from the least automated condition to the more automated
condition:
– The Full Operator Control (FOC) condition: conflict detection was
automatic; Heading decision, implementation of the decision,
and engagement of the adjusted heading command were
performed by the participant;
– The condition: conflict detection and heading decision were
automatic (navigation display indicated a new heading
direction which would avoid the conflict); Implementation of
the indicated heading using the scroll wheel, and engagement
of this decision using the keypress were performed by the
participant;
– The Automatic decision and implementation - Operator engagement (ADI-
OE) condition: conflict detection, heading decision and imple-
mentation of this decision were automatic; Engagement of the
command was performed by the participant with a keypress;
– the Full Automatic control (FAC) condition: Automation tools
predicted the conflict, selected, implemented and engaged the
Figure 1. Experimental set up with the navigation display on the left, and the autopilot interface on the right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075.g001
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adapted command (indicated by a sound coupled to a green
light). The operator merely observed.
Each participant performed four blocks of trials, each block of
trials corresponding to one level of automation. The blocks were
tested in random order. Within each block of trials, participants
experienced 9 trials (three for each Action/Effect delay tested,
again in random order). Finally, at the end of each block of 9 trials,
participants made an explicit judgement of agency, by verbally
reporting how strongly they felt that they caused the manoeuvre to
avoid conflict, using a scale from 0 (no causal involvement) to 3
(strong causal involvement).
Results
In this study, our primary concern is the relationship between
level of automation and our two measures of sense of agency: the
perceived duration of intervals between actions and effects and the
explicit judgement of causal control.
Temporal judgement
Each participant made 3 temporal judgments for each
combination of Automation Level and Action/Effect delay. Participants’
mean temporal judgments served as the primary units of analysis.
We performed a 4* 3 ANOVA with Action/Effect delay (750, 1500,
2250 ms) and Automation level (FOC, AD-OIE, ADI-OE and FAC) as
within subject factors.
There was a significant main effect of Action/Effect delay,
F(2,24) = 209.68; p,.01., gp
2 = .95 (see Fig. 4). Post-hoc analysis
revealed that the interval estimates increased monotonically with
the actual interval: the longer the actual action delay was, the
longer the action-effect interval was perceived (all ps,.01). These
results indicate that participants were able to track the physical
variation of the interval.
More interestingly, there was also a significant main effect of
Automation level, F(3,36) = 26.154; p,.01, gp
2 = .69 (see Fig. 5).
Post-hoc analysis revealed that interval estimates increased
monotonically with the level of automation: the more the system
Figure 2. Typical sequence of events for one trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075.g002
Figure 3. Automation level and cognitive processes in our aircraft navigation task. The red text indicates functions performed by the
human operator and black text indicates function performed automatically by the system.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075.g003
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was automated, or the less it relied on participant’s actual
control, the longer the action-effect interval was perceived (all
ps,.01). These results indicate that IB is sensitive to levels of
automation, with increasing automation leading to a higher
interval estimates, which we interpret as a gradual decrease in
sense of agency.
Finally, the effect of Automation Level was modulated by the
Action/Effect delay, as demonstrated by the significant two-way
interaction between these factors: F(6,72) = 8.457; p,.01,
gp
2 = .42. Post-hoc analysis reveals that interval estimates from
the medium and large Action/Effect delays were strongly
modulated by the automation level (p,.01), whilst estimates from
the small Action/effect delays were not significantly modulated
(p..01) (see Fig. 4).
Explicit Judgement of Agency
Each participant returned one judgment of agency per
Automation Level (see Fig. 5). A repeated measures ANOVA
showed a significant influence of Automation Level, F(3,36)
= 46,204; p,.01, gp
2 = .79. Post hoc analysis shows that
judgement of causality decreased monotonically with the level of
automation (all ps,.01). As expected, explicit judgements of
agency follow the facts of agency. But this is not completely trivial,
as judgements of agency frequently do not follow actual control in
situations where agency is ambiguous [19], [20].
Finally, we correlated the mean binding effect and the explicit
judgement of agency across the four levels of automation for
each individual subject. We then tested the resulting r(3)
correlation coefficients for the group of all 13 subjects against
0. Correlation between authorship and binding effects was
negative and significant (Mean r =20.84, SD= 0.105,
t(12) =228.821, p,.001), indicating that as actual levels of
control were varied, changes in intentional binding closely
tracked explicit judgements of agency. This finding boosts the
use of intentional binding as an implicit window into human
agency.
Discussion
In this experiment, we explored intentional binding in a rich
and complex situation involving flying an aircraft with various
degrees of autopilot assistance. Our study yielded three important
results. First, we observed a strong relation between measures of IB
and different levels of system automation. Second, our data
revealed a gradual increase in temporal estimation with the
increasing level of automation. The more the system was
automated, the longer the action-effect interval was perceived.
Third, the effect of automation level on intentional binding was
dependent on the actual action-effect delays. There was a strong
effect of automation level on binding for medium and large action-
effect intervals and no effect for small action-effect intervals. Such
findings have important implications concerning the precise
conditions under which the intentional binding effect occurs:
intentional binding is an empirically robust phenomenon that
occurs in complex control situations, is sensitive to graded
variations in actual level of control, and is task dependent. We
now discuss these in turn.
Robustness of the binding effect
Our findings confirm the interest of the intentional binding as
implicit measure of agency. First, we provide evidence that
quantitative changes in binding are strongly associated with
progressive changes in actual level of control, and also with
quantitative changes in explicit ratings of agency (but see [9]).
Second, we replicate the basic binding effect in a situation with
high face-validity, in which action-event sequences paralleled
those that participants might meet in their everyday lives.
Interactions with machines regularly involve sending a com-
mand to a system, and monitoring the system response, and we
regularly feel a sense of controlling how the machine behaves in
such situations. Our data thus lend external validity to
intentional binding. They confirm that temporal distortions
associated with agency occur in everyday life. Intentional
Figure 4. Modulation of interval estimates by actual interval between action and effect for each automation level. Stars represent
significant effects (p,.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075.g004
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binding may be a useful measure in future cognitive engineering
studies.
Binding by degrees
Our results reveal a gradual increase of interval estimates with
the increasing level of automation. In contrast, many previous
studies of agency have relied on binary agency-attribution
judgements [21]. In binary agency-attribution, judgements of
agency may depend on a match between predicted and actual
effects, leading to a simple ‘me’ vs. ‘not me’ decision [22]. Our
finding of binding by degrees goes beyond a simple compare and
decide model. Instead, our results suggest that several features of
the way in which intentions guide and sustain action contribute to
the experience of acting, and the sense of control. In particular, in
our task participants always judged the interval between
command engagement and conflict resolution. However, we
found that the amount of operator involvement in processing
stages preceding the command engagement, such as decision and
implementation of the heading adjustment, strongly influenced
interval estimates. Thus, specific subprocesses of intentional
control may be relevant for sense of agency. For example,
processes that generate and select between action alternatives
may also contribute to the sense of control over action outcomes
(see also [23]). In contrast, previous work emphasised the role of
retrospective comparison of intended and actual outcomes in
agency judgements [24], [25]. More generally, our result suggests
action selection, planning and intention realisation may all
contribute to sense of agency. In this way, our results are
consistent with recent arguments that sense of agency is based on
cue integration [26].
Binding effect and time constraints
Our results suggest that temporal binding is not present for the
shortest interval tested here (750 ms). Other studies have suggested
that longer action–outcome intervals were associated with reduced
binding [7], [9], [27]. Here we show that very short intervals could
also decrease the intentional binding effect. Interestingly, the short
interval tested here corresponds to a large interval in previous
studies [9], suggesting this is unlikely to be simply a floor effect.
The complex nature of the actions and their effects in our device
may explain the preferential binding over longer intervals. We
propose that temporal contiguity is task dependent and that
intentional binding occurs in a specific ‘‘window of opportunity’’
which may vary across tasks, and may also depend on the range of
action-effect delays experienced in a given setting. Operant
learning is similarly sensitive to the natural time delays of the
system linking actions to effects, even for systems as familiar as
one’s own body. For example, when rats learn to avoid eating food
associated with illness, the optimal delay between eating and illness
is not the shortest possible delay, but a delay consistent with their
normal digestive operation [28].
Conclusion
We found a distortion of time perception in the control of
complex machinery, which adds to a growing literature on sense of
agency. Our findings are significant in four ways: First,
demonstration of binding effects in a richer and more complex
paradigm provides external validity for intentional binding.
Second, we show agreement between implicit binding measures
of sense of agency, and explicit agency judgement, in such a
complex setting. Third, we demonstrate that intentional binding
Figure 5. Modulation of interval estimates and explicit judgement of agency by automation level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075.g005
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occurs over temporal windows between action and effect that are
longer than those studied previously (see also [11], [29]), according
to the significant features of the given task. Fourth, we show that
intentional binding measures are sensitive to graded variations in
actual and subjective control associated with automation.
The link between automation and sense of agency holds
promise for future applications. From a cognitive engineering
viewpoint, the ability to measure sense of agency quantitatively is
important, since it allows sense of agency to be used as a measure
in evaluating operator experience. In future research, we will test
whether systems that produce stronger subjective sense of agency
also produce better performance. When we get on an airplane, we
believe (and hope!) that the pilot feels in personal control of the
aircraft. Our results offer the interesting possibility of testing
whether this is actually true. In a next step, our work could provide
guidelines regarding how to boost this feeling of control, and could
assess whether feeling of control are related to actual levels of
performance in controlling the aircraft.
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